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          IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
GLEN WAYNE NIELSON and 
CHERYL E. NIELSON, husband and 
wife, 
 
  Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
 
v. 
 
ROBERT TALBOT and MICHELE 
TALBOT, husband and wife, 
 
and 
 
PAUL PARKER AND SAUNDRA 
PARKER, husband and wife, 
 
Defendants/Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Supreme Court of 
Idaho 
Case No. 44864 
 
APPELLANTS’ REPLY BRIEF 
 
 
 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
FOR FRANKLIN COUNTY 
THE HONORABLE JUDGE NAFTZ, PRESIDING 
 
 
Blake S. Atkin 
ATKIN LAW OFFICES, P.C. 
7579 North Westside Highway 
Clifton, Idaho  83228 
Telephone: (801) 533-0300 
Facsimile: (801) 533-0380 
Attorney for Appellants 
Lane V. Erickson 
RACINE, OLSON, NYE, BUDGE &  
    BAILEY CHARTERED 
201 East Center, P.O. Box 1391 
Pocatello, Idaho  83204-1391 
Facsimile:  (208) 232-7352 
Attorney for Respondents 
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THE ANCIENT CAMPBELL CASE MUST BE READ IN LIGHT OF THE LATER 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESENCE CAUSE OF ACTION 
 The Parker and Talbot brief demonstrates a fundamental lack of understanding of the 
common law and the way in which causes of action develop.  As cases are decided, the elements 
of a cause of action begin to emerge.  As later cases focus on different aspects of a particular 
type of dispute new elements required to establish the cause of action are developed.  In our legal 
system, it is the duty of the courts and lawyers to coalesce those precedents in order to distill 
from them the elements that must be proved to establish the common law cause of action.  In this 
case, Plaintiffs were deeded land by metes and bounds.  That metes and bounds description in 
their deed created a prima facie case that the Plaintiffs were the owners of the property therein 
described.  Defendants disputed that ownership.  It was incumbent on them to identify the legal 
theory they were pursuing that would deprive Plaintiffs of ownership of a portion of the property 
they thought they owned.  One such legal theory is the doctrine of boundary by agreement or 
acquiescence. Boundary by agreement or acquiescence has three elements: (1) there must be an 
uncertain or disputed boundary, (2) a subsequent agreement fixing the boundary, and (3) 
subsequent purchasers must be put on notice of the boundary that is different from their deed.  
Luce v. Marble, 142 Idaho 264, 127 P. 3d 167 (2005).   The fact pattern presented to the court 
was a supposed agreement that the boundary would be different from that contained in the 
contract the parties drew up that contained a clear metes and bounds description.  The problem 
for the Defendants was that there was never the element of an uncertain or disputed boundary.  
Without such uncertainty or dispute there is no consideration for the supposed agreement and 
one of the necessary elements of the cause of action for boundary by agreement or acquiescence 
cannot be met.   
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 That an early Idaho case did not happen to discuss the element of uncertainty or dispute 
that  provides the necessary support for ignoring the clear metes and bounds description, one of 
the later developed elements of the cause of action, is of no moment.  All of the relevant 
precedent must be applied to arrive at a just and satisfying result in the later cases.  In this case, 
the fact that the ancient Campbell 1case did not explore the necessity for a dispute between the 
parties to provide the consideration for a boundary by agreement or acquiescence does not give 
license to the trial court to ignore later cases such as Luce v. Marble, 142 Idaho 264, 127 P. 3d 
167 (2005) that synthesizes the agreement element of the cause of action with the dispute 
element of the cause of action for boundary by acquiescence.  If this Court were to accept 
Defendants’ argument, the Luce case with its holding that there are three elements to a cause of 
action for boundary by agreement or acquiescence would be written out of our common law.  
 Indeed, early on Defendants’ recognized this case as a case of boundary by acquiescence.  
Only later, when it became apparent that the facts would not support a claim of boundary by 
agreement or acquiescence did the new argument begin.  Only after the facts demonstrated that 
there had never been any uncertainty or dispute to be resolved by agreement between the parties 
was it argued that a case following this fact pattern could be decided without the essential 
element of a dispute or uncertainty as to the location of that boundary line.  Such sloppy analysis 
is not worthy of the noble common law system we embrace in this state.   
UNDER OUR SYSTEM, A CASE CANNOT BE TRIED ON COMPETING AFFIDAVITS 
 As Defendants correctly point out, Plaintiffs did raise a genuine issue of material fact 
through submission of the affidavit of Vince Whitehead that refuted the so-called undisputed 
                                                          
1 Campbell v. Weisbrod, 73 Idaho 82, 89, 245 P.2d 1052, 1057 (1952). 
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facts on which Defendants relied in their motion for summary judgment and their brief in this 
appeal.   
 Mr. Whitehead was the builder who built the home the Defendants now live in.  In his 
affidavit he stated that when he came on the property twenty years ago there was no fence.   At 
the time Vince Whitehead bought the property there was neither a fence nor lilac bushes.  See 
Appendix, Exhibit D; Clerk’s Record on Appeal at p.p. 250-251.  When he bought the property 
the fence did not exist and he could not discern a boundary line on the ground.  Appendix, 
Exhibit D; Clerk’s Record on Appeal at p.p. 250-251. There were no sprinkler systems.  There 
was no shed.   There was no carport.  In short, the fence was removed before any of the 
“landmarks” on which defendants now rely were later added.  The person who built the shed had 
never seen the fence.  The person who built the sprinkler system had never seen the fence.  The 
person who planted the lilacs had never seen the fence.  The person who built the carport had 
never seen the fence.   
 When that testimony is coupled with the testimony of Craig Shaffer that he and the 
Murdocks believed that the legal description they had prepared pinpointed the location of the 
fence,  and he would not have signed the deed had he believed that the legal description did not 
accurately define the boundary of the property.  Appendix, Exhibit E; Clerk’s Record on Appeal 
at p.p. 152-154; See Appendix, Exhibit S; Clerk’s Record on Appeal at p.p. 147-148.  One is left 
with confidence that the fence was not actually located where the other markers now exist.  At 
least there is a genuine issue of material fact whether the fence coincided with the markers to 
which the Defendants now point.    
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 Nor is it of any moment in a summary judgment proceeding that the Defendants produced 
a second affidavit of Mr. Whitehead in which he states that he cannot be sure his memory of 
what happened 20 years ago is accurate.  Such a later affidavit, while perhaps creating a genuine 
issue of material fact cannot be allowed to circumvent Plaintiffs’ right to a jury trial.  It is not 
difficult to perceive a line of questioning where Mr. Whitehead is on the stand and the Plaintiffs’ 
lawyer pulls out his first affidavit and asks “When first asked about the fence, you testified that 
the fence was gone when you arrived on the scene?  He answers, “that is correct.”  The lawyer 
asks, “and it was only after that testimony was called into question did you agree that your 
memory of what happened 20 years ago may not be accurate?”  He responds, “that is correct.”  
“But your first recollection was that the fence was gone when you first visited the property 
twenty years ago.”  He answers, “that is correct.”  Given that questioning, a jury very well might 
conclude that the fence was gone when Mr. Whitehead arrived on the scene to build Defendants’ 
house, and therefore all the so-called markers of the fence line were installed after the fence was 
long gone, by people who had never seen the fence.   Those are the kind of issues that trials are 
made of.  It was inappropriate on this record for the trial court to grant summary judgment.   
DATED this 28th day of September, 2017. 
      Atkin Law Offices 
 
                                                        ___ 
      Blake S. Atkin 
      Attorneys for the Plaintiffs 
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